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
Memorandum of Conference

PRESENT: Admiral Radford, Admiral Carney, General Twining, General Ridgemay, Coneral Emphard, DCI, DBCI, DD/I 11 a.m., Saturday, 5 June

SUPJECT: Split Paper on det stimutes

- 1. Admiral Radford opened by saying that the Chines were personally familiar with the problem and he thought it best if they stated their views individually.
- 2. Admiral Carmey led off reading from and verbally underscoring certain points in a monorandum he had submitted to the Chiefs (copy attached).
- 3. General Twining expressed his opinion as being roughly in accord with that of Admiral Carney and felt it was simply a quantion of orderly administrative procedure being preferable to establishing "committees for everything".
- 4. General Shepherd stated that USMC had no interest in the natter officially and that he was serely present to educate himself.
- 5. Comeral Ridgeway supported previous statements and want on to say that in his opinion whatever organizational arrangement was set up by the President, there would necessarily be the closest collaboration between CIA and the services but that in his view the exercise was essentially a three phase one-the intelligence appreciation, the military war game and finally the estimate of industrial and civilian desage that would result from the net penetration. He felt that CIA had the imjer role in the first, that the second was exclusively a military problem and that in the third the military with a heavy assist from ODE should do the work.
- 6. Mr. Dulles underscored his statutory responsibility and the fact that he was speaking for the LAC opensuity and not for GUA. (This really is in response to the divious sisconception expressed by Admiral Carney to the effect that CIA was really a collector of information.) Mr. Dulles further streesed the need for a pregnetic approach rather than abstract discussion of rights one responsibilities and sade it clear that the sotual working operation would be in his opinion hamiled by a tesm headed by a designee of the Chiefs of Staff and by a senior military men saich as General Bull to represent CMA. He also meserted that he had no interest in learning detailed war plans or otherwise dealing in operational information except to the extent that the deformive and counter-off moive results we expected to achieve would influence Russian capabilities and choices of This Company is post of my integrated courses of action.

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- 7. There was general agreement that this prognetic aggreed was a sound one and that irrespective of which decision the Prosident made, a "marriage" between intelligence and the operating people would have to be close and complete. On the other hand Admiral Radford more than once reverted to his concept that intelligence finishes its work when it turns over an appreciation to the operational pleasure who then have the prime responsibility for coming up with the over-all estimate.
- 8. Mr. Dulles made it clear that he was not asking to do anything if it was not properly inespendily within the scope of the duties of the Director of Central Intelligence, that what he was after was responsible participation. He also spoke quite frankly along the lines that this would be a long term advanta t to the services in diving them dispessionate and fiscally disinterested assistance in reaching this all important estimate upon which their future request for funds might so largely depend. He stated that the civilians whether in the defense catablishment or otherwise on the Council had a terriency to poch-poch Russian strength and that some day such an attitude might course an administration to set limits on military preparedness that would be disastrous to the national security. At about this point Admiral Endford raised the question of NIB 10-3 (Consunist Camabilities to Intervene in Indechine) and stated that he thought it was a crime to permit such "gross estimates" to go to untutored civilians. DD/I responded that it was just this kind of evil-of requiring the untatored and everyorised senior civilian official of the government to "marry" estimatesthat the CIA proposal was istended to deal with. This led to a general discussion and admission by all concerned that we were talking not exclusively about continental deferme but about such military problems as Indochina sud even such diplomatic problems as last fall's Tricate orisis. (It was interesting to learn at this point that the Department of State had liven the Joint Chiefe of Staff a sere No minutes marning of the intended de marcho.)
- 9. General Cabell commented that in his opinion a most important element was the constant injection of intelligence into the problem and into the analysis rather than a single estimate and then shelication of responsibility thereafter by the intelligence community.
- 10. Admiral Radford ammunesd at the und that the Chiefs would have a mosting to reconsider their paper and would also talk to Mr. Milson. But there was little indication that they would do anything other than reaffirm their position. On the other hand the entire mosting was most friendly and cordial and it is my personal conclusion that we have in fact promises from the Chiefs to permit our de facto participation fully and virtually without restriction in the exercise whether or not organisational solution A or B is adopted.

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Density Director Intelligence

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